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Introduction
Well before the recent financial and economic crisis in Asia began, a vigorous debate emerged
about the factors behind the real growth performance of Eastern Asia since the 1960s and the
barriers to further growth. Originally the debate revolved around the question whether the typical
neo-classical factors, i.e. those limiting the role of governments and strengthening that of markets
in reallocating resources to their most efficient use, or interventionist measures, i.e. those
regulating financial markets and imposing industrialization policies, have explained the region’s
exceptional growth performance. In 1993 the World Bank  further complicated the debate by
introducing a ‘market-friendly’ approach as a way to blend aspects of the neo-classical and
revisionist viewpoints (World Bank 1993).
More recently the debate has become focused around the question whether the accumulation of
capital in Eastern Asia was so rapid that the growth process became extensive and that future
growth is likely to slow down because of diminishing returns to capital (Krugman 1994). Indeed,
some scholars report rapid accumulation in combination with low total factor productivity growth
in Asia  (Kim and Lau 1994; Young 1992, 1994, 1995) but others emphasize that, despite rapid
accumulation, total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Eastern Asia has been quite respectable
when compared to other developing regions in the world (Nehru and Dhareshwar 1994; Sarel
1995; Collins and Bosworth 1996; Nadiri and Son 1997; Timmer 2000). In a recent paper,
Easterly and Levine (1999) argue that it is TFP growth rather than capital accumulation which
accounts for a substantial share of cross-country differences in per capita incomes. Others argue
that the production function approach, which underlies this growth accounting work, is
inappropriate as the distinction between capital accumulation and total factor productivity cannot
be made so that the fundamental driving factor behind economic  growth, i.e. the search process to
master new capital goods and substitute capital for labour, remains hidden (Nelson and Pack
1999). The recent literature on endogenous growth also suggests that returns on capital may be
higher than assumed in the Solow production function because of spillovers. The surge of foreign
inflows of capital in emerging markets during the 1990s has rekindled a new interest in foreign
investment as a source of important spillovers to domestic capital (Balasubramanyam, Salisu and
Sapsford 1996; De Mello 1997; Borenzstein a.o. 1998).
Much of this debate has lacked clarity for several reasons, two of which are addressed in this
paper. The first is related to the measurement of domestic capital stock and the second to the
measurement of the relative importance of FDI in relation to domestic capital stock.
Lack of reliable data in combination with the sensitivity of the procedures seriously limits the
number of countries for which one can derive robust  estimates of the domestic capital stock
(Nehru and Dhareshwar 1993; Sarel 1997). As a result, many studies, in particular those making
use of cross-country regressions, have used investment-output ratios as a proxy for the change in
capital stock. This procedure assumes that marginal and average capital-output ratios are the
same. A recent study by Fukuda and Toya has emphasised that this assumption is particularly
unrealistic for Eastern Asia where economies are  characterized by relatively low capital-output
ratios in combination with high rates of capital accumulation (Fukuda and Toya 1999).
Those scholars who constructed capital stock estimates, reverted to different procedures.
Essentially, two basic methods are available, namely wealth surveys valuing the capital stock in
place at user value, and perpetual inventory estimates which are obtained by cumulating
investment data using assumptions of the life time of assets and their depreciation pattern. The
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latter approach has been applied in two international data sets aiming to include as many countries
as possible, namely the World Bank data set on physical capital (Nehru and Dhareshwar 1993)
and the Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston 1991). The series from both data sets involve
very substantial measurement problems as the estimates are either based on indirect procedures,
such as using investment/GDP ratios (Penn World Tables) or rough methods to derive a reliable
benchmark estimates for the stock (World Bank data set).1
Section I of this paper concentrates on capital stock estimates for two East Asian countries
with extraordinarily rapid economic growth over the past decades, namely the Republic of Korea
(henceforth Korea) and the Republic of China, Taiwan Area (henceforth Taiwan). We review
existing estimates based on wealth surveys and the perpetual inventory method and construct new
stock estimates for the total economy and manufacturing using the perpetual inventory method
with assumptions on asset lives and depreciation patterns that are standardized across countries
(Maddison 1995).
Section II of the paper analyses the new capital stock estimates in greater detail by relating
changes in capital-output ratios at various levels of capital-labour ratios (capital intensity) to
changes in levels of output-labour ratios (labour productivity). This allows us to analyse the
behaviour of these variables in relation to Solow’s production function, which also relates capital
intensity and labour productivity under the assumption of diminishing returns to capital as the
elasticity of output with respect to capital represents the factor share of capital in total output
(Solow 1956). Comparisons are made with estimates for the United States in order to indicate the
gaps in labour productivity and capital intensity which still remain between the East Asian
countries and the United States.
The second problem which we address in this paper relates to the impact of foreign direct
investment on the domestic capital stock. Most studies use FDI as a percentage of domestic
investment to indicate the importance of foreign investment on capital growth. However, the
interpretation of this ratio is not as straightforward as it may appear. Instead, it is more meaningful
to look at the share of foreign capital stock in the domestic capital stock. This will be done for
Taiwan and Korea in Section III.
The estimates in this paper are for the total economy as well as for the manufacturing sector
alone. The debate on the role of capital accumulation in growth often ignores the crucial
differences concerning these relations at the sectoral level vis-à-vis the total economy level. The
manufacturing sector in particular is likely to show different patterns as the process of capital
intensification and the inflow of FDI was of greater importance there than in other sectors of the
economy.
I. Estimating the physical capital stock in Korea and Taiwan
Because a worldwide standardization of the measurement of physical capital is still lacking,
international comparisons of capital input are fraught with problems.2 Ideally, capital input needs
to be measured as the flow of capital services from the installed capital stock. This flow approach
requires detailed data on the composition of the capital stock and rental prices of the different
assets (Jorgenson and Griliches 1967). However, for most countries data on rental prices are not
available so that service flows cannot be measured.3 Therefore one has to rely on stock measures
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 As this paper concentrates on two countries, we prefer to use methods that make use of the data to a fuller extent, thus
improving international comparability of national data. Hence we refrain from using either the World Bank or Penn
World Table data in the remainder of this paper.
2
 In this paper we concentrate on non-residential capital stock, i.e. non-residential buildings, and other construction
(except land improvement), machinery and equipment and transport equipment.
3
 Using data on asset lifetimes a rough approximation of the service flow can be made (Timmer 2000).
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and assume that capital services are proportional to the aggregate capital stock. Capital stock
estimates are sometimes based on wealth surveys (see below), but more often on the perpetual
inventory method (PIM), which has also been used for the estimates of Korea and Taiwan in this
paper.
I.1 The perpetual inventory method
The perpetual inventory method, pioneered by Goldsmith (1951), estimates the capital stock as the
sum of past real investments which have survived up to the current period. This method requires
assumptions with regard to service lives and retirement patterns of assets. In this paper we
compile estimates of the gross fixed capital stock for the total economy and for manufacturing,
assuming that assets are discarded in one stroke at the end of their service lifetime. It is also assumed
that repair and maintenance will keep the physical production capabilities of an asset constant during
its lifetime. This is known as the one-hoss-shay efficiency pattern or rectangular retirement.4 Hence
the stock of asset type i at time t (Kit)  is given by:
∑
+−
=
t
1dt
itit
i
IK (1)
with Iit investment at constant prices in asset type i at time t and di the service lifetime of asset i. Use
of equation (1) gives gross fixed capital stock estimates which include depreciation as defined in
the national accounts. Depreciation as reported by firms is largely determined by accounting and
tax conventions and much less so by the actual decline in productive capacity of the capital stock.
Instead we assume that the productive capacity of each asset is constant until it is scrapped at the
end of its lifetime.
An important problem in comparing perpetual inventory estimates of the capital stock across
countries is that not only the depreciation patterns but also the assumptions concerning asset lives
may differ substantially. For example, even within the OECD, where countries are at relatively
similar levels of economic development, asset lives for non-residential structures vary between 39
years in the United States, 57 years in Germany and 66 years in Great Britain (Maddison 1995).
Some of these differences may be ‘true’ differences as, among other reasons, an accelerated GDP
growth can speed up the replacement of new for old assets. However, the observed differences
cannot be directly related to this. Hence as a second-best approach (until internationally
comparable asset lives are available) one may calculate the stock on the basis of standardized
asset lives across countries. The standardization method was pioneered by Maddison (1995) for
total economy estimates for France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Great Britain and the United
States, and was replicated for manufacturing in Germany, Japan and the United States by Van Ark
and Pilat (1993) and for other sectors of the economy in France, Germany, Japan, Great Britain
and the United States by O’Mahony (1996). Hofman (1998) applied the standardization procedure
to six Latin American countries.
I.2 Standardized capital stock estimates for Korea and Taiwan
The capital stock estimates for Korea and Taiwan in this paper are based on the standardized
perpetual inventory method described above. Estimates for the total economy are provided from
1951 (Taiwan) or 1953 (Korea) up to 1995, and for manufacturing from 1960 to 1993. In general
the method involves the following data requirements: gross investment series at current prices, price
indices to revalue investment to constant base year replacement costs, asset service lifetimes or rates
of actual depreciation, and a benchmark capital stock figure. We have constructed our benchmark
capital stock figure for the beginning year of the period on the basis of our long series of investment
back to the beginning of the century. The estimates and sources are presented in Appendix 1. Below
we summarize the main elements of our procedures.
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 Different types of efficiency patterns such as geometric decline or straight-line depreciation are discussed for OECD
countries in for instance Ward (1976), Blades (1993) and O’Mahony (1996).
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Korea, total economy
For the period 1953-1995 two series on capital formation were obtained from the Korean national
accounts, one for non-residential buildings and other construction (except land improvement) and
one for transport equipment and machinery and equipment. For the period 1914-1940, we
obtained similar series from Pyo (1996). To bridge the period 1940-1953, we estimated capital
formation on the basis of output series assuming investment-output ratios at 0.10 for the period
1940-1944, at 0.00 for 1945 and 1946, at 0.05 for 1947-1950 and at 0.00 for 1951 and 1952. After
linking, the investment series was expressed in 1990 Won. As the 1940-1953 figures were not
divided into series for non-residential structures and machinery and equipment, we used an
average of the pre- and post- five year period share. Next we applied the perpetual inventory
method by using standardized asset lives of 39 years for structures and 14 years for equipment
from Maddison (1995). Moreover we discounted all pre-1953 investment by 40% to account for
war damage (Maddison 1998: 66). The first cumulated benchmark estimate is provided for 1953.
The estimates are adjusted from end-year to mid-year basis.
Taiwan, total economy
The procedure for the estimation of the capital stock of the Taiwanese economy was similar to
that used for Korea. For the period 1951-1996 two series on capital formation were obtained from
the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) for non-residential
structures and for plant and equipment. For the period 1912-1938, we obtained total gross capital
formation figures from Mizoguchi (1997). To bridge the period 1938-1951, we estimated capital
formation on the basis of output series assuming investment-output ratios at 0.1 for the period
1939-1944, at 0 for 1945 and 1946 and at 0.05 for 1947-1950. After linking, the whole investment
series was expressed in 1991 New Taiwanese dollars. As the 1938-1951 figures were not divided
into series for non-residential structures and machinery and equipment, we used a average of the
pre- and post- five year period share. Next we applied the perpetual inventory method, by using
the standardised asset lives of 39 years for structures and 14 years for equipment from Maddison
(1995). The first cumulated benchmark estimate could be provided for 1951. The estimates were
adjusted from end-year to mid-year basis.
Korea and Taiwan, manufacturing
For manufacturing only one series for total capital formation (excluding residential structures)
could be obtained from the post-war national accounts. To obtain an average standardized asset
life for the aggregate manufacturing investment series, we used average asset lives from OECD
countries at 45 years for investment in non-residential structures and 17 years for investment in
equipment and vehicles (Van Ark and Pilat 1993: 42). These asset life estimates were weighted by
the share in gross fixed capital formation for Taiwan in 1987, which provided an average lifetime
of 25 years.5 Investment series for manufacturing go back to 1953 for Korea and 1951 for Taiwan.
We obtained investment series for the pre-1953 period (Korea) and pre-1951 period (Taiwan)
using the trend in capital formation for the total economy in both countries. For Korea we applied
a 40 per cent war damage adjustment.6
I.3 The sensitivity of the capital stock estimates
Clearly the standardization procedure is sensitive for the various assumptions involved. Assumptions
concerning asset life times in particular affect the results. For example, one might argue that asset
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 The share in gross fixed capital formation in Taiwanese manufacturing was 31%  for structures and 69%  for
equipment in 1987 (MOEA 1987: Table 2-4).
6
 This procedure slightly differs from that used in Timmer (2000) where the pre-1953 and pre- 1951 series are derived
from average growth rates for 1951/56 (for Taiwan) and 1953/57 for Korea.
Timmer and van Ark
5
lifetimes in rapidly growing Asian countries are likely to be shorter than those in more slowly
growing OECD economies because of higher investment rates and a more rapid turnover of firms
due to the continuing process of introducing new technologies from more advanced countries
(industrial upgrading). To test this proposition we recalculated the standardized estimates for the
total economy and manufacturing in Korea and Taiwan using alternative asset life assumptions.7
Table 1. Capital stock estimates using alternative lifetimes:
Total economy and manufacturing, 1987.
(% of preferred estimate).
Alternative lifetime assumptions (years)
Total Economy 18+5
years
22+6
years
30+10
years
39+14
years
45+19
years (a)
Korea 73 79 94 100 104
Taiwan 65 72 89 100 107
Manufacturing 10 years 15 years 20 years 25 years 30 years
Korea 77 92 97 100 101
Taiwan 64 86 96 100 101
(a) for Korea: 42 years for non-residential structure and 19 years for plant and equipment.
Source: PIM estimates with rectangular retirement patterns, war-damage adjustment (for Korea) and
alternative lifetimes for total non-residential fixed capital using investment series from Appendix 1,
compared with the preferred estimates discussed in main text.
The overall conclusion from the table is that small variations in lifetimes have a limited impact on
capital stock estimates for these East Asian countries. If the assumed asset lifetime for Korea and
Taiwan is reduced to 30 years for structures and 10 years for plant and equipment, the total
economy stock in 1987 declines with 6% and 11% respectively. The effects for manufacturing are
even smaller since the faster growth of investment compared to the total economy reduces the
impact of changes in asset lives. Further study on international differences in asset lifetimes is
called for but in the remainder of this paper we use our preferred estimates.
I.4 Comparison of the results with previous estimates
For both Korea and Taiwan capital stock estimates, based on a mix of national wealth surveys and
the perpetual inventory method exist. In a series of papers, Pyo provides estimates of gross fixed
capital stock in Korea based on wealth surveys in 1968, 1977 and 1987, linked with investment
from the national accounts (Pyo 1988, 1992, 1998). For linking, use is made of the polynomial-
benchmark method for the period between benchmark years. For the period before the first and
after the last benchmark year the perpetual inventory method is applied. Pyo’s method assumes
that the benchmark estimates from the wealth surveys are the best available estimates. An
important advantage of this method is that depreciation of the assets can be calculated directly
from the model (Pyo 1998). In his earlier work Pyo estimated gross and net capital stocks
independently. In his latest report he first estimates net capital stocks, which are converted to
gross stocks using interpolated net-gross conversion ratios from the wealth surveys (Pyo 1998).
This revision leads to a downward adjustment of the results, especially before 1968. Kim and
Hong (1997) also base their estimates on wealth survey data, but use only data for 1987 as they
consider these to be more reliable than the results of previous surveys.8
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 Variations in retirement patterns have only small effects. Similarly, variations in initial year estimates have also little
influence as by far the biggest part of investment in these dynamic economies has been made in the last decades. A
sensitivity analysis on capital stock estimates for OECD countries is given in O’Mahaony (1996).
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 Pyo provides a comparison of his old and new estimates (Pyo 1998: Table 12). The pre-1977 figures given in this table
are based on erroneously aggregated figures in an earlier publication (Pyo 1992: Table A2). Pyo also shows that the
results of Kim and Hong (1997) lead to implausibly high estimates of the capital stock in the 1960s and 1970s. For
1962, their estimate is more than three times higher than his.
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Official capital stock estimates for Taiwanese manufacturing are provided by the Directorate
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), using the benchmark extrapolation
method (DGBAS 1999). However, capital formation in agriculture is excluded in the estimates by
DGBAS.
Tables 2 and 3 compare the value of the capital stock according to our standardized estimates
derived from the perpetual inventory method with those from Pyo and DGBAS respectively. In all
cases our estimates are lower than the estimates based on the wealth surveys. The gap in the early
years is particularly large for Taiwan, and especially for manufacturing. But for the total economy
the gap is also large when one takes into account that our estimates include capital stock in
agriculture, whereas the DGBAS figures do not. However, the gap between the DGBAS estimates
and our figures becomes much smaller over time. This implies that our estimates show more rapid
capital accumulation than the wealth-based estimates. For Korea, the gap between Pyo’s and our
estimates is much more constant.
Both because of reporting errors and theoretical differences, the PIM estimates inevitably
differ from the wealth survey results. There are two main limitations of the PIM method (Pyo
1998). The first is the need for long historical investment series. In this paper, we show that this
limitation can be overcome using historical national accounts studies. A second limitation is the
need to assume particular asset lifetimes. Lifetimes might differ across countries and over time
and further research is needed here. By using standardized asset lives as in this paper,
international comparability is enhanced. The estimation procedure is transparent and it is possible
to check the sensitivity of the results. Wealth surveys have the advantage that they measure the
assets actual in use, but in extrapolating the benchmark stock assumptions concerning retirements
have to be made as well. The actual nature of the survey is crucial for its usefulness for capital
stock measurement (Ward 1976). Ideally, the survey should be a survey of physical assets on a
case-by-case basis and it should have a complete coverage, but such surveys are complicated and
prone to measurement errors. If instead the survey is based on book values, as often reported in
censuses, its use is much more circumspect. Balance sheets valuations reflect a cumulation of
historical prices of different time periods, depend on the depreciation accounting practices of
firms which are mainly influenced by tax conventions rather than the actual decline in productive
capacity, and the vintage composition of the stock is unknown. The Korean wealth survey comes
close to a survey of physical assets (Pyo 1998: 19), but the official Taiwanese capital stock figures
seem to be based on balance sheets.9 Another important shortcoming of using wealth surveys is
the problem of obtaining consistent methods of evaluation both across countries and over time
(Ward 1976). Therefore we prefer to use our internationally consistent estimates based on the PIM
method.
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 Comparison with the Taiwanese production census data suggests that the census is used as a benchmark. According to
DGBAS, the total gross value of fixed assets in the manufacturing sector in use in 1991, excluding land, was NT$ 3,544
billion in 1986 prices (DGBAS 1991: Table 10). This figure is almost identical to the NT$ 3,537 billion given in
DGBAS (1994).
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Table 2. Capital stock in Korea according to this study and Pyo:
Total economy and manufacturing, 1953-1996.
Total economy Manufacturing
This study Pyo This study/ This study Pyo This study/
Pyo Pyo
bln. 1990 Won (%) bln. 1990 Won (%)
    1953 8,666 11,241 77
    1963 13,108 19,518 67 2,936 3,848 76
    1973 46,226 55,256 84 9,344 14,673 64
    1985 224,602 297,191 76 59,855 102,137 59
    1996 736,682 980,149 75 247,448 404,847 61
Average annual growth
rate (%)
    Average annual growth
rate (%)
1953/63 4.1 5.5
1963/73 12.6 10.4 11.6 13.4
1973/85 13.2 14.0 15.5 16.2
1985/96 10.8 10.8 12.9 12.5
Note: All growth rates in this paper are logarithmic.
Sources: Investment series from Bank of Korea, National Accounts and for the pre-war period from  Pyo (1996).
Assumptions as explained in text. Survey estimate from Pyo (1998: Table A4).
Table 3. Capital stock in Taiwan according to this study and DGBAS:
Total economy and manufacturing, 1951-1995
Total economy Manufacturing
This study DGBAS This
study/
This study DGBAS This study/
DGBAS DGBAS
bln. 1991 Taiw. $ (%) bln. 1991 Taiw. $ (%)
1953 326,050
1963 490,476 645,910 76 83,078 340,038 24
1973 1,402,549 1,545,568 91 414,371 727,338 57
1985 5,339,055 5,707,863 94 1,816,015 2,316,079 78
1996 13,667,004 13,220,471 103 4,691,847 5,754,758 82
Average annual growth
rate (%)
Average annual growth
rate (%)
1953/63 4.1
1963/73 10.5 8.7 16.1 7.6
1973/85 11.1 10.9 12.3 9.7
1985/96 8.5 7.6 8.6 8.3
Note: DGBAS (1999) excludes capital in the agricultural sector of the economy.
Source: Investment series from DGBAS, National Income in Taiwan Area; Mizoguchi (1997).
Assumptions as explained in text. Survey estimate taken from DGBAS (1999, Table 1).
II. Diminishing returns and catch-up potential: The need for structural change
In order to put the rapid growth in the capital stock in the East Asian countries in perspective, this
section looks at the pace of capital accumulation in relation to the change in labour input and
output. This provides an indication of the efficiency with which the massive investment flows
have been absorbed in the economy. We first focus on changes in the capital-output ratios to
analyse the issue of diminishing returns to investment. The issue is then treated more in depth by
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taking into account labour input and relating capital intensity and labour productivity trends and
levels. An international perspective is taken by comparing developments  in Korea and Taiwan
with those in the United States.
II.1 Diminishing returns to investment?
It has been suggested by various authors that capital accumulation in East Asia has been so rapid
that decreasing returns are likely to set in. To this end we present comparative trends in capital-
output ratios in international prices. Output and capital stock were converted to US dollars (prices
of 1990) on the basis of purchasing-power parities for GDP and capital formation respectively.
GDP is taken from the database of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre and various
ICOP studies.10 Figure 1 shows the changes in the capital-output ratio in the total economy. In the
1960s, Korea and Taiwan were characterized by strikingly low capital-output levels compared to
the United States as stressed by Fukuda and Toya (1998). This indicates that capital was used in a
highly productive way. As the investment process accelerated in the following decades, the capital-
output ratio slowly converged towards the level of the United States. It reflects a change in the
economic structure towards more capital-intensive production processes. In 1995, the amount of
capital used per unit of output was still considerably lower in the East Asian countries than in the
United States.
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Figure 1. Capital-output ratios in 1990 US dollars
Korea, Taiwan and USA, total economy 1960-1996
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Figure 2. Capital-output ratios in 1990 US dollars:
 Korea, Taiwan and USA, manufacturing  1960-1996
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Yet the relative changes in the capital-output ratio in manufacturing were rather different as shown
in Figure 2. In the early phase of industrialization in the 1960s, capital-output ratios were already
high and comparable to those in the United States.11 This contradicts the suggestion by Fukuda and
Toya (1998) that the low capital-output ratios at the total economy level in East Asia are mainly
due to low levels in manufacturing. On the contrary, the low capital-output ratios in the non-
manufacturing sectors account for the lower total economy levels relative to the United States.
When comparing the relative trends between the total economy and manufacturing, it should be
noted that all figures are converted into 1990 US dollars using purchasing-power parities. It is a
stylized fact that relative price levels of developing countries relative to the United States (or any
other advanced country) are higher in manufacturing than in non-manufacturing. Indeed, in 1987
the relative price level (i.e. the purchasing-power parity relative to the exchange rate) of Korea vis-
à-vis the United States was 85% for manufacturing output but only 58% for the total economy. For
Taiwan the difference was smaller, i.e. a relative price level of 78% for manufacturing versus 61%
for the total economy (Timmer 2000). Hence, in domestic prices the difference between capital-
output ratios in the total economy and manufacturing would be less but still significant.
A particularly interesting feature of Figure 2 is the development of the capital-output ratio in
Korean manufacturing, first declining from a very high level in the 1960s to a minimum in the
1970s, then increasing, especially towards the end of the 1980s. The declining trend in the 1960s
has also been found by Hong (1976). In Taiwanese manufacturing the ratio steadily rose since the
early 1960s with a similar acceleration in the 1980s. The difference between Korea and Taiwan in
the 1970s reflects the different industrial development. In both countries investments were geared
towards labour-intensive exports but at the same time secondary import substitution and the
establishment of heavy industries such as oil refining and basic metals was pushed much more in
Korea than in Taiwan (Amsden 1989; Timmer 2000).
The rapid increase in the capital-output ratio in the late 1980s in both countries suggests that
capital has been accumulated in the manufacturing sector at increasingly faster rates with little
additional output growth. In 1995, the ratio in both countries was higher than in the United States.
This observation lends partial support to those who argue that diminishing returns to capital will
reduce further growth prospects in East Asia (Krugman 1994; Young 1995). Still, from the
beginning of the 1980s onwards, the manufacturing sector in Korea and especially in Taiwan
underwent radical structural changes. Rising wages and increased competition from other Asian
low-cost producers caused the competitiveness in the labour-intensive industries such as textiles
and wearing apparel to dwindle rapidly. As a result, manufacturing activities were quickly
upgraded. The capital-output ratios suggest that this process of industrial upgrading did not
translate into higher output growth rates. On the contrary, as the capital intensification of the
production process proceeded, similar investment efforts  generated less output growth than
before when investments were in more mature and labour-intensive technologies.
However, to fully assess the impact on the growth potential of the Korean and Taiwanese
economy, we need to look not only at the relation between capital and output but to take labour
inputs into account as well. Initially, investments were accompanied by a rapid increase in the
labour force but during the 1980s the growth of the labour force stagnated, especially in
manufacturing.
II.2 The remaining potential for catch-up
Table 4 shows the non-residential capital stock per hour worked in Korea, Taiwan and the United
States. Employment series for both the total economy and manufacturing are derived from
national account statistics, and average hours worked from the database of the Groningen Growth
and Development Centre and various ICOP studies. The table confirms the extraordinarily rapid
growth of capital intensity in Korea and Taiwan, in particular since the early 1970s, both in
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manufacturing and the total economy. Before 1973 capital intensity grew more slowly in Korea.
However, it should be recognized that in 1963 Korean capital intensity in manufacturing was
already some 40% higher than in Taiwan. Despite the rapid growth in capital-labour ratios, the
gap in capital intensity relative to the United States was still huge by 1996. For the total economy
capital-labour ratios were around 30% of the level of the United States in 1996. Relative capital
intensity was somewhat higher in manufacturing but still left a gap of about 50% in both countries
compared to the United States.12 This indicates that also within manufacturing, relative labour-
intensive activities still dominate production. This is also true at a lower level of aggregation.
Timmer (2000) found large gaps in capital intensity between the East Asian countries and the
United States in all 2-digit manufacturing industries, except textiles.
To analyse the issue of diminishing returns comprehensively, we need to look not only at the
capital-labour ratios but also at labour productivity ratios relative to the United States. Table 5
shows the level of value added per hour worked in Korea, Taiwan and the United States for the
total economy and manufacturing. It is clear that the rapid growth in capital intensity is reflected
in rapid labour productivity growth. It appears that, despite the lower level of capital intensity, the
labour productivity level for the total economy has been substantially higher than in
manufacturing. This implies that non-manufacturing sectors create higher productivity levels with
lower capital intensity. This again points at the different relative output price levels in
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors discussed above. Even though, when using
domestic prices, manufacturing tends to create more output per working-hour with more capital
per working-hour, in international prices, non-manufacturing sectors create more output per
working-hour even with less capital.
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Table 4. Capital per hour worked in Korea, Taiwan and United States, total economy and
manufacturing, 1963-1996.
Korea Taiwan United States
Total Manufac- Total Manufac- Total Manufac-
Economy Turing Economy turing Economy Turing
1990 US dollars 1990 US dollars 1990 US dollars
1963 1.20 2.67 1.76 1.93 41.31 25.17
1973 2.68 3.07 3.59 4.02 49.92 33.13
1985 8.90 9.47 10.74 10.94 63.54 51.01
1996 21.86 31.24 23.64 29.83 69.94 65.42
Average annual growth
rate (%)
Average annual growth rate
(%)
Average annual growth
rate (%)
1963/73 8.0 1.4 7.1 7.3 1.9 2.7
1973/85 10.0 9.4 9.1 8.3 2.0 3.6
1985/96 8.2 10.9 7.2 9.1 0.9 2.3
Sources: Capital stock from Tables 2 and 3. Converted into 1990 US dollars on the basis of purchasing-power
parities for investment calculated from Penn World Tables, Version 5.6. Employment from national accounts:
Korea: EPB, Annual Report on the Economically Active Population; Taiwan: DGBAS, Statistical Yearbook of
the Republic of China and Monthly Bulletin of Manpower Statistics; United States: BEA, National Income and
Product Accounts of the United States. Working-hours total economy from GGDC Total Economy Database and
manufacturing from Pilat (1994) for Korea and USA and from DGBAS, Monthly Bulletin of Earnings and
Productivity for Taiwan.
Table 5: Value added per hour worked in Korea, Taiwan and United States, total economy and
manufacturing, 1963-1996.
Korea Taiwan United States
Total Manufac- Total Manufac- Total Manufac-
economy Turing economy turing Economy turing
1990 US dollars 1990 US dollars 1990 US dollars
1963 2.28 0.83 1.90 1.23 18.52 14.19
1973 3.63 1.76 3.90 2.85 23.60 19.10
1985 6.07 3.56 7.45 5.00 27.33 24.19
1996 11.38 8.36 14.17 9.80 30.35 32.91
average growth rates (%) average growth rates
(%)
average growth rates
(%)
1963/73 4.7 7.6 7.2 8.4 2.4 3.0
1973/85 4.3 5.8 5.4 4.7 1.2 2.0
1985/96 5.7 7.8 5.8 6.1 1.0 2.8
Sources: Output from Bank of Korea, National Income in Korea 1975;  National Accounts, various issues,
linked with OECD, National Account Statistics, 1997; for Taiwan from DGBAS, National Income in Taiwan
Area of the Republic of China, 1994; United States from BEA, National Income and Product Accounts of the
United States. Converted into 1990 dollars on the basis of 1990 Geary Khamis purchasing-power parities from
Maddison (1995) for total economy. For manufacturing on the basis of unit value ratios from Pilat (1994) for
Korea and from Timmer (2000) for Taiwan. Employment and hours as in Table 4.
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Figures 3 and 4 show the relationship between the non-residential capital stock per hour worked
and GDP per hour worked in 1990 dollars for the total economy and manufacturing respectively in
a graphical format. These graphs may be seen as representing a neo-classical production function
of the type:
Y/L = A F(K/L)
with Y = value added, K = capital, L = labour and A = technology level.
According to this equation the change in labour productivity is a function of the change in capital-
labour ratios and technical change. The traditional neo-classical growth model of Solow (1956)
suggests that capital accumulation will go together with diminishing returns so that the Y/L - K/L
relationship is reflected in the concave nature of the lines in Figures 3 and 4. Alternatively, Y/L
can also increase because of technical change, which means a continuous upward shift of the lines
in Figures 3 and 4. An impressionistic observation of Figure 3 suggests that for the total economy
a continuous upward shift of the production function, i.e. technical change driving labour
productivity growth, is a clear possibility. This possibility, in combination with the remaining large
gaps in capital intensity and labour productivity, suggests that despite rising capital-output ratios
there is still scope for further catch-up growth. Disentangling the effects of capital accumulation
and total factor productivity more precisely goes beyond the scope of this paper and is a topic of
further research (Pilat 1994; Timmer 2000).
The findings in this section suggest that continued growth in East Asia on the basis of
expansion of inputs is not ‘inevitably subject to diminishing returns’ (Krugman 1994: 63). The
finding that gaps in capital intensity between the United States and the East Asian countries are
still large suggests that there is still much scope for further investment-driven growth. The rising
capital-output ratios suggest that this process needs to be complemented with changes in the
industrial stucture, introduction of new technologies and improvements in the credit allocation
mechanisms. This need is reinforced by the currency crisis in 1997 and 1998. Foreign direct
investment can play an important role in this process by augmenting the domestic investment effort
and through associated technology spillovers.
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Figure 3.  Labour productivity and capital intensity:
total economy, 1990 US dollars.
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Figure 4.  Labour productivity and capital intensity:
manufacturing, 1990 US dollars.
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III. Foreign direct investment as a contributor to productive capital
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played an important role in the economic development
process of Eastern Asia since the heyday of colonial rule in the region. Clearly the nature of
foreign capital flows has changed from maximizing revenues  from  exports during the period of
colonization to strengthening the industrial process  since the 1960s (Lindblad 1998).
Beforehand, it should be emphasized that FDI accounts for only a small share of the total
foreign capital inflow in Korea and Taiwan. For example, in the early 1960s net foreign capital,
i.e. inflows minus outflows, accounted for  50-75% of gross domestic investment in Korea and 40-
50% of investment in Taiwan. In both countries around 75-85% of such inflows consisted of
bilateral loans, in particular from the United States. Over time the share of all foreign capital in
total domestic investment declined whereas the share of private loans relative to public capital
increased. In Taiwan net foreign capital turned strongly negative during the 1980s as Taiwanese
firms started to invest abroad. FDI as a percentage of total net foreign capital increased over time,
but on average it was less than 20% in Taiwan and only 7% in Korea between 1961 and 1986
(Stallings 1990). Our focus is on FDI because these are most strongly associated with
simultaneous technology flows and as such a potential source of spillovers, due to advanced
production techniques, new management and organisational practices and marketing networks
(Blomström and Kokko 1998).13
According to the IMF definition, FDI refers to investment made to acquire lasting interest in
enterprises operating outside the economy of the investors. FDI can be in the form of equity
capital, reinvested earnings and provision of intercompany loans.14 When using FDI statistics two
important distinctions must be made. Gross flows differ from net flows in so far that according to
the latter concept outward FDI is netted with inward FDI. As Korea and Taiwan have become
major outward investors in recent years, this distinction is important. Here we use the gross flows.
A second  distinction is made between approved and disbursed flows. The latter refers to FDI
flows which are realised, while the former refers to planned flows approved by the recipient
government. In this paper we look at disbursed FDI flows into Korea and Taiwan. Hence it refers
to all realised FDI flows into the two countries.
A third distinction that might be made, but is not pursued here, is the origin of FDI inflows.
The incidence of technology spillovers is probably higher in FDI from industrialized countries but
much less so in FDI from other countries at roughly the same level of technological development.
In Korea in 1980, about 90% of the FDI stock originated from developed areas, but in Taiwan this
was only 65% as Hong Kong and Singapore also invested heavily in this economy (United
Nations 1992).
FDI in Korea
For estimates of FDI flows in Korea we made use of the International Direct Investment Statistics
Yearbook published by the OECD for the period from 1985 to 1995. The flows are based on
arrivals less capital withdrawn. These flows are linked by a series for 1970-1984 from UNCTC
                                           
13
 Still, if one adheres to the screening theory of international capital markets, foreign capital might be more productive
than domestic capital as investment projects financed by (private) foreign capital are more stringently screened. One
might also argue that in the particular case of Korea and Taiwan, the large amounts of capital aid provided by the United
States in the 1950s had high spillovers as well because it was tied to technical assistance in planning economic reforms
(Amsden 1989).
14
 Flows of FDI are notoriously hard to measure so that  there is a high degree of incomparability of FDI statistics from
different countries. This is due to three main reasons. First, countries differ in their definition of foreign direct
investment. Second, they differ in their methods of data collection. And, third, corporate accounting practices and
valuation methods differ between countries. As a general rule the most important characteristic of FDI which
distinguishes it from portfolio investment is that it is undertaken with the intention of exercising control over the
enterprise (United Nations 1992: 39).
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(1992). This linking is justified as both series use the same concept of FDI but, unfortunately, the
latter series is only available for the total economy. To estimate flows into manufacturing, we
applied the share of the manufacturing sector in total flows derived from stock figures in the same
publication. The current flows have been deflated by the domestic investment price index
(Appendix 2).
In most studies the impact of FDI is analysed by expressing FDI as a percentage of gross fixed
capital formation in the domestic economy. Doing so, it appears that, at least in quantitative terms,
FDI has never been important in Korea. The ratio of the FDI flows to gross fixed capital formation
(GFCF) in non-residential capital peaked in 1973 at about 6% but declined afterwards to less than
2% in the 1980s at the time when domestic investment boomed. For manufacturing the FDI flow
ratio was of course higher, peaking in 1973 at 16% but never exceeding the level of  4% after
1974. This ratio is often interpreted as an indicator of the portion of domestic capital formation
undertaken by foreigners. However, one has to be careful with this interpretation. Investment in
the sense of FDI is rather different from the concept of total investment used in the National
Accounts. In addition to newly established investments, FDI also includes the acquisition of
existing assets in the host country and is as such not fully comparable with gross domestic capital
formation according to the National Accounts definition which measures only additions to the
existing stock of domestic capital. In fact, the major part of FDI into Taiwan and Korea consists of
equity rather than reinvested earnings or intercompany loans. A high ratio of FDI to GFCF may
indicate little more than a high rate of foreign take-overs without anything happening to new
investment.
Therefore, as argued by Ramstetter (1996), a more meaningful indicator of the importance of
FDI is calculated by using the share of foreign multinationals in total output or, as here, the share
of FDI stock in the total gross domestic fixed capital stock. For the measurement of FDI stock we
used a similar procedure as for our estimates of the total capital stock, i.e. we added annual FDI
flows to a benchmark FDI stock for 1970 for the total economy and for 1971 for the
manufacturing sector. The benchmarks are taken from UNCTC (1992) (Appendix 2) and based on
cumulating FDI flows since 1962.
FDI in Taiwan
Data on FDI in Taiwan are more difficult to obtain  than for Korea. The first basic source is the
Statistics on Chinese and Foreign Investment published by the Investment Commission of the
Ministry of Overseas and Economic Affairs (MOEA) which publishes the Statistics on Overseas
Chinese and Foreign Investment. This source is used by most researchers as it provides detailed
time series on inward and outward FDI flows by sector and by country. However, a major
disadvantage of this source is that it only collects data on approved FDI, not on actually disbursed
FDI. An alternative is to use data collected by the Central Bank of China in the Balance of
Payments which provides data on disbursed FDI that unfortunately is not broken down by sector.
In addition, these series are shorter than those from MOEA. We therefore choose to use data on
approved FDI from MOEA which are corrected by a ratio of disbursed to  approved FDI. This
ratio is based on data of FDI flows to Taiwan disbursed from Japan and the United States.
Disbursed flows from these two countries are divided by approved flows from these countries as
recorded by the MOEA year by year.15 The average ratio for the period 1982-1993 is 0.66
(Appendix 2). This ratio is then used to transform the data on approved FDI from MOEA into
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 Disbursed FDI from Japan and the United States constitute about 55% of total approved FDI in Taiwan during the
period 1952-1993. Although one would expect that there is a lag between approval of FDI and the actual disbursement
of this approved amount, a simple correlation analysis reveals that there is a high correlation between approved and
disbursed flows in the same year (0.90 for Japan, 0.73 for the United States) which is much higher than the correlation
between approvals and lagged disbursement. Hence we take the ratio of approved and disbursed amounts in the same
year.
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disbursed flows for both total and manufacturing FDI.16 As for Korea we calculated stocks of FDI
by cumulating previous flows. For Taiwan we could use data going back to 1952 (Appendix 2).
In Figure 5 we show the ratio of FDI stock to non-residential gross fixed domestic capital stock
for both the total economy and the manufacturing sector in Korea. This gives an indication of the
portion of the domestic capital stock which is under foreign control.17 It shows clearly that the FDI
stock was most important in the 1970s and declined in importance afterwards. Looking at the
actual shares one can conclude that FDI has never been important in quantitative terms, neither for
the economy as a whole nor for the manufacturing sector. It never constituted more than 6.5% of
the non-residential capital stock in the manufacturing sector in 1975, declining to a mere 2 % in
the 1990s. Instead the process of rapid economic growth in Korea in the past decades, and
especially in the booming 1980s, was overridingly based on national investment efforts.
In Figure 6 we show the corresponding figures for Taiwan. It clearly shows that the importance
of foreign firms dramatically increased during the period 1960-1973. The share increased from
less than 1% to almost 6% in the total economy. It was especially important in the manufacturing
sector where the ratio increased from 2% to more than 14%. After 1973,  the importance of
foreign firms in terms of capital stock declined and more or less stabilized in the 1980s at about
4% for the total economy and 8% for manufacturing.18
When we compare the Taiwanese experience with that of Korea, the simultaneity of the peaks
in importance of FDI in the beginning of the 1970s stands out clearly. In both countries the
importance of FDI declined rapidly afterwards and stabilized in the 1980s. The most important
difference between these two East Asian countries concerns the importance of FDI in absolute
terms. In Taiwan FDI constitutes a larger share in the domestic capital stock than in Korea, not
only in the 1970s but also in the 1990s. Korea was characterized by a larger distrust and a higher
degree of regulation of FDI. Until the beginning of the 1980s, Korea pursued an extremely
cautious policy towards FDI (Hill 1990). In contrast to Korea, Taiwan offered a hospitable
environment for FDI providing foreign investors with infrastructure and fiscal incentives since the
early 1950s. FDI took off in the early stage of export-oriented growth in the 1960s, stimulated by
the establishment of the first Export Processing Zones in 1966.19 The electrical machinery branch
in particular took up most of the FDI in this period.20
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 Alternatively, one might take the lower estimate by Schive based on unpublished data of about 0.45 (Schive 1988:
383). This indicates that our ratio might be too high, probably caused by the fact that Japanese and American investors
realized more of their proposed projects than other investors in Taiwan. However, we also compared our estimates for
disbursed FDI with those according to the balance of payments. Trends and levels are roughly comparable.
Accumulating the data for 1976-1993 shows that our estimates are 14% higher than the balance of payments  figures,
which is within reasonable limits (Appendix 2.4).
17
 Even this interpretation is tricky. First of all, FDI is not only directed towards acquisition of fixed capital only, but
also includes non-fixed assets. Hence one should  divide by the total capital stock rather than by the fixed capital stock.
More importantly, a firm does not have to be totally foreign-owned to be under foreign control. Most of the time only a
part of the shares of a firm will render a foreign investor an effective voice in the management of the enterprise. If this is
frequently the case, the ratio of FDI stock to total domestic capital stock will be an underestimate of the part of the
domestic capital stock which is actually under foreign management. A rough estimate using data from Schive (1988:
Table 2) shows that in Taiwan about 60% of the assets of firms classified as foreign was in foreign hands in 1985.
18
 A sizeable amount of FDI into Taiwan consists of investments by overseas Chinese, blurring the distinction between
’domestic’ and foreign firms. Investment from this group was actively encouraged by the government (Hill 1990). In
1980, 35% of accumulated FDI consisted of overseas Chinese investment but this share rapidly declined to 15% in 1993
(MOEA 1993).
19
 But certainly not solely directed to these zones (Schive 1988).
20
 About 50% of the total accumulated (approved) stock in manufacturing in 1970 (MOEA 1993).
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Figure 5.   Stock of foreign direct investment as a percentage of non-
residential gross fixed domestic capital stock in Korea, 1971-1995.
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Figure  6. Stock of foreign direct investment as a percentage of non-
residential gross fixed domestic capital stock in Taiwan, 1960-1993.
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In a survey on the importance of FDI for Taiwanese development, Schive (1988) stresses that
although the contribution of FDI to capital formation might be small, the importance of foreign
firms should not be understated. In Taiwan these firms were geared into labour-intensive export
activities and as such made a major contribution when their relative contribution is expressed in
terms of value added, employment or exports. Foreign affiliates in Taiwanese manufacturing
accounted for about 16% of total manufacturing employment in the 1970s (Schive 1988: Table 6).
However, when these foreign firms are weighted by the actual ownership share of foreigners their
contribution drops to about 10% of employment. This is comparable to our estimated share of FDI
in the total capital stock. This is also true for Korea, albeit to a lesser extent. In 1974 foreign
affiliates accounted for 10% of value added in the manufacturing sector, increasing to 16% in
1977 but declining to 11% in 1986 (Ramstetter 1996: Table 6). In any case, the figures indicate
that foreign firms might be more important than appears from the share of FDI.
Going beyond the quantitative picture drawn by comparing shares of FDI stock in the total
capital stock, many studies stress the importance of FDI as a vehicle of technology transfers which
makes it different from domestic investment. Although the capital transfer involved in FDI might
be relatively small, the technology and managerial skills transferred through FDI are often of a
much greater importance than suggested by the size of capital flows. These spillovers consist of
the introduction of new technologies which can either be embodied in machinery or consist of
disembodied technical knowledge. Often it also involves marketing knowledge and helps to
alleviate export marketing problems of domestic firms, for example through production under a
foreign brand name. This so-called ‘original equipment manufacturing’ was very important in the
establishment of first the garment and later the electrical machinery sector in Korea and Taiwan
(Hobday 1995). Externalities can also occur because of demand creation by foreign firms through
local sourcing of parts and components. The importance of these spillovers can only be quantified
using econometric techniques, which will be the next step in our research.
However, as the contrasting cases of Latin America and East Asia demonstrate, the positive
spillover effects of FDI are highly dependent on the institutional framework under which FDI
takes place. At least three important conditions were fulfilled in East Asia, but much less so in
Latin America. First, various studies have shown that before new technologies can be
productively absorbed, the level of human skills must be sufficiently developed. Second, there
must be interaction between domestic and foreign firms, for example through subcontracting or a
high mobility of workers. Third, the foreign firms must operate in the international market rather
than relying on production for a protected domestic market as in Latin America (Hill 1990; De
Mello 1997). In a recent cross-country regression these points have been stressed again.
Borenzstein and associates (1998) found that FDI contributes more to growth in per capita income
than domestic investment but only when the host country has reached a minimum threshold stock
of human capital.21 Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford (1996) found that the growth-
enhancing effects of FDI are stronger in those countries which pursue an outward-oriented trade
policy.
In any case both Taiwan and Korea have strongly relied on other sources for foreign
technology acquisition as well. A major vehicle for transfer of technology in these two countries
was large imports of capital goods. Much of the literature on Korean industrial development
indicates that for basic standard technologies in mature industries, formal vehicles have not been
important. Reverse engineering, defined as learning through the purchase and operation of capital
goods but also through assistance from vendors and buyers and study of the technological
literature delivered the majority of the crucial information on new technologies. Only at later
stages of industrial development, when more advanced technologies are aimed at, do formal
agreements gain in importance (Enos 1989).
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 These cross-country studies treat both FDI and domestic investment as investments in the sense of the national
accounts, thus ignoring the difference discussed above.
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Conclusion
In this paper we first reconstructed the non-residential capital stock of Korea and Taiwan, and
then compared capital-output ratios, capital-labour ratios and labour productivity levels with those
in the United States for both the total economy and manufacturing.22 With respect to the capital-
output ratios we find a continuous increase over time for the total economy. In manufacturing we
found a strong rise in capital-output ratios since the 1980s. At the same time we found  that there
are still large gaps between the East Asian countries and the United States in terms of capital-
labour ratios and labour productivity. This indicates that, despite the deteriorating performance of
capital goods, opportunities for further growth on the basis of accumulation are still far from
exhausted. However, this requires continuous changes in the industrial structure, introduction of
new technologies and improvements in the credit allocation mechanisms. Foreign direct
investment can play an important role in this process by augmenting the domestic investment
effort and through associated technology spillovers.
Secondly, we investigated the extent at which FDI accounted for the rise in the capital stock of
Korea and Taiwan, and the extent to which it might have been a cause of rapid technological
progress. Overall, we found fairly low shares of FDI in the capital stock, peaking during the 1970s
and then following a declining trend in the 1980s. The latter is an unfortunate development in the
light of declining returns to capital and the need for new technological impetus. FDI can be a
major source of growth as it  can create important technology spillovers in the economies. The
main contribution of this paper has been to provide a better database to analyse these issues in
more detail, for example by using growth accounting and regression techniques to assess the
sources of growth in a more formal way.
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Appendix Table 1.1 Nonresidential Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Nonresidential Gross Fixed
Capital Stock in South Korea, Total Economy
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Gross Fixed Capital Stock GFCS
(GFCF), bln. 1990 Won (GFCS), bln. 1990 Won in 1990
Structures Equipment Total Structures Equipment Total mln. US$
1913 58 33 92
1914 67 32 99
1915 73 24 97
1916 67 25 91
1917 83 42 125
1918 102 72 174
1919 106 79 185
1920 116 43 159
1921 133 47 181
1922 189 46 235
1923 181 52 234
1924 151 56 207
1925 184 50 233
1926 221 74 295
1927 251 101 352
1928 250 134 384
1929 281 160 441
1930 272 184 456
1931 245 142 387
1932 233 135 368
1933 295 163 458
1934 381 225 606
1935 438 276 714
1936 498 212 709
1937 492 189 681
1938 580 227 807
1939 658 369 1,028
1940 692 490 1,182
1941 803 395 1,198
1942 798 393 1,191
1943 810 399 1,209
1944 775 382 1,156
1945 0 0 0
1946 0 0 0
1947 226 112 338
1948 244 120 364
1949 262 129 391
1950 282 139 421
1951 0 0 0
1952 0 0 0
1953 266 88 354 6,976 1,690 8,666 13,334
1954 280 125 405 7,207 1,539 8,746 13,457
1955 369 158 527 7,490 1,415 8,904 13,701
1956 317 218 535 7,788 1,366 9,154 14,085
1957 420 231 651 8,101 1,353 9,454 14,547
1958 432 212 644 8,465 1,341 9,805 15,087
1959 497 189 686 8,863 1,427 10,289 15,832
1960 415 217 632 9,244 1,629 10,873 16,731
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1961 523 229 752 9,616 1,819 11,435 17,595
1962 706 303 1,009 10,119 2,016 12,135 18,672
1963 887 399 1,286 10,816 2,292 13,108 20,170
1964 861 306 1,167 11,590 2,564 14,154 21,779
1965 1,135 379 1,514 12,467 2,865 15,331 23,590
1966 1,400 802 2,203 13,593 3,455 17,048 26,232
1967 1,640 1,059 2,699 14,963 4,342 19,305 29,704
1968 2,303 1,384 3,687 16,775 5,457 22,232 34,208
1969 3,272 1,678 4,950 19,397 6,846 26,243 40,380
1970 3,309 1,604 4,913 22,533 8,299 30,832 47,441
1971 3,197 1,974 5,171 25,642 9,864 35,506 54,633
1972 3,304 2,199 5,503 28,734 11,729 40,463 62,260
1973 4,178 2,652 6,830 32,272 13,954 46,226 71,127
1974 3,968 3,181 7,149 36,100 16,667 52,767 81,192
1975 4,443 3,484 7,927 40,024 19,777 59,801 92,015
1976 5,307 4,717 10,024 44,602 23,611 68,213 104,960
1977 6,616 6,312 12,928 50,242 28,775 79,017 121,583
1978 7,789 9,387 17,176 57,073 36,273 93,346 143,631
1979 8,846 10,875 19,720 64,985 46,061 111,047 170,867
1980 8,725 8,859 17,584 73,322 55,338 128,660 197,968
1981 8,639 8,900 17,539 81,524 63,287 144,811 222,819
1982 9,977 8,937 18,914 90,349 70,984 161,333 248,242
1983 11,936 9,695 21,631 100,830 78,769 179,599 276,348
1984 13,497 11,312 24,808 113,314 87,631 200,945 309,193
1985 14,225 11,860 26,085 127,175 97,428 224,602 345,594
1986 13,934 14,677 28,611 141,187 108,609 249,796 384,359
1987 16,467 17,483 33,950 156,246 122,264 278,510 428,541
1988 18,301 19,766 38,067 173,479 137,971 311,450 479,226
1989 21,147 22,567 43,713 193,039 155,805 348,844 536,764
1990 25,028 26,845 51,873 216,042 176,410 392,452 603,863
1991 28,284 30,088 58,372 242,698 199,361 442,059 680,193
1992 29,102 29,767 58,868 271,257 221,439 492,696 758,109
1993 31,419 29,722 61,140 301,244 241,052 542,297 834,428
1994 33,650 36,726 70,376 333,454 264,409 597,863 919,929
1995 36,613 42,521 79,134 368,243 295,153 663,396 1,020,762
1996 39,920 46,094 86,013 406,140 330,541 736,682 1,133,527
1997 42,245 40,868 83,112 446,796 364,706 811,502 1,248,653
Sources and notes: Total gross capital formation (excluding residential and land improvement) for 1914-1940 Pyo
(1996) and for 1953-1997 from Bank of Korea, National Accounts (various issues). Capital formation from 1940-
1953 on the basis of output series assuming investment-output ratios at 0.10 for the period 1939-1944, at 0.00 for
1945 and 1946, at 0.05 for 1947-1950 and at 0.00 for 1951 and 1952. Output from Maddison (1995), Monitoring the
World Economy, 1820-1992 (OECD Development Centre). After linking, the whole investment series was expressed
in 1990 Won. 1940-1953 figures were divided into series for nonresidential structures and machinery and equipment
using an average of the pre- and post-war period share of 67 per cent for structures. Investment was accumulated
by using the standardized asset lives of 39 years for structures and 14 years for equipment from Maddison (1995).
Moreover we discounted all pre-1953 investment by 40 per cent  for war damage (Maddison, 1998, Table 3.10, p.
66). Stocks adjusted to mid-year. Estimates were converted to US dollars on the basis of PPPs for investment
obtained from Penn World Tables 5.3 (see Summers and Heston, 1991).
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Appendix Table 1.2 Nonresidential Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Nonresidential Gross Fixed
Capital Stock in Taiwan, Total Economy
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Gross Fixed Capital Stock GFCS
(GFCF), mln. 1991 NT$ (GFCS), mln. 1991 NT$ in 1990
Structures Equipment Total Structures Equipment Total mln. US$
1912 3,177 849 4,026
1913 2,818 439 3,257
1914 2,314 394 2,708
1915 1,858 384 2,242
1916 1,919 348 2,268
1917 3,448 538 3,986
1918 2,793 508 3,301
1919 4,138 847 4,986
1920 6,579 867 7,445
1921 5,924 982 6,906
1922 4,834 675 5,509
1923 4,841 743 5,585
1924 3,955 570 4,525
1925 5,475 745 6,220
1926 5,456 898 6,355
1927 6,474 1,051 7,525
1928 7,767 1,377 9,144
1929 8,291 1,360 9,651
1930 7,265 1,560 8,825
1931 7,104 1,289 8,393
1932 8,807 1,259 10,066
1933 9,579 1,554 11,133
1934 10,314 2,198 12,512
1935 13,269 2,816 16,085
1936 14,247 2,974 17,221
1937 10,564 3,099 13,663
1938 11,411 3,633 15,043
1939 13,481 4,494 17,975
1940 13,432 4,477 17,909
1941 14,777 4,926 19,702
1942 15,864 5,288 21,151
1943 10,814 3,605 14,419
1944 7,427 2,476 9,902
1945 0 0 0
1946 0 0 0
1947 4,710 1,570 6,280
1948 5,097 1,699 6,796
1949 5,518 1,839 7,357
1950 5,973 1,991 7,964
1951 7,337 2,783 10,120 273,794 38,937 312,731
1952 8,779 4,160 12,938 278,854 39,043 317,897
1953 11,654 4,974 16,628 286,504 39,546 326,050 12,115
1954 12,086 4,848 16,934 296,288 39,972 336,260 12,494
1955 10,404 4,279 14,683 305,645 39,834 345,479 12,837
1956 11,018 5,921 16,939 313,672 39,828 353,499 13,135
1957 10,121 6,353 16,474 321,120 41,518 362,639 13,474
1958 12,392 7,723 20,115 328,911 45,516 374,428 13,912
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1959 14,997 9,371 24,368 337,248 52,825 390,073 14,494
1960 18,769 10,428 29,196 347,880 62,724 410,604 15,256
1961 19,153 12,277 31,431 361,462 73,292 434,754 16,154
1962 22,297 11,301 33,598 377,350 83,447 460,797 17,121
1963 25,077 13,019 38,096 396,638 93,838 490,476 18,224
1964 28,455 15,011 43,466 418,690 105,937 524,627 19,493
1965 29,736 23,115 52,852 442,320 122,614 564,934 20,991
1966 34,764 31,097 65,861 468,606 146,248 614,854 22,845
1967 42,166 38,862 81,029 499,950 176,661 676,612 25,140
1968 50,172 46,661 96,833 538,091 214,512 752,603 27,964
1969 53,667 56,034 109,700 582,232 261,296 843,528 31,342
1970 54,302 73,919 128,221 629,032 321,172 950,204 35,306
1971 57,600 94,585 152,186 677,028 399,287 1,076,315 39,992
1972 70,091 113,064 183,155 731,680 496,074 1,227,755 45,618
1973 72,636 130,785 203,421 793,097 609,452 1,402,549 52,113
1974 82,001 153,130 235,131 858,624 741,510 1,600,134 59,455
1975 116,709 164,760 281,470 944,221 889,103 1,833,324 68,119
1976 128,531 162,158 290,689 1,054,436 1,040,773 2,095,208 77,849
1977 146,938 149,732 296,671 1,181,183 1,184,558 2,365,741 87,901
1978 160,022 173,566 333,588 1,322,217 1,332,192 2,654,409 98,627
1979 170,747 212,233 382,980 1,474,145 1,506,028 2,980,173 110,731
1980 184,580 261,437 446,017 1,637,705 1,715,757 3,353,462 124,601
1981 181,567 280,945 462,512 1,805,458 1,951,968 3,757,426 139,611
1982 184,863 279,846 464,709 1,975,334 2,189,602 4,164,936 154,752
1983 181,788 278,575 460,362 2,149,539 2,417,465 4,567,004 169,691
1984 194,208 279,031 473,238 2,333,823 2,631,291 4,965,114 184,484
1985 203,696 239,452 443,148 2,532,774 2,806,280 5,339,055 198,378
1986 210,091 268,717 478,808 2,737,313 2,956,540 5,693,853 211,561
1987 246,986 344,289 591,275 2,960,949 3,141,118 6,102,067 226,728
1988 277,737 402,569 680,306 3,218,003 3,372,590 6,590,593 244,880
1989 307,768 483,570 791,338 3,505,010 3,656,714 7,161,724 266,101
1990 351,629 524,174 875,803 3,828,053 3,997,128 7,825,180 290,752
1991 416,769 548,503 965,271 4,204,194 4,377,521 8,581,715 318,862
1992 459,567 653,339 1,112,905 4,632,145 4,816,792 9,448,938 351,084
1993 522,251 667,796 1,190,047 5,111,184 5,284,460 10,395,645 386,260
1994 593,028 714,258 1,307,287 5,657,579 5,738,653 11,396,232 423,438
1995 641,714 796,995 1,438,709 6,264,239 6,223,089 12,487,328 463,979
1996 645,289 857,285 1,502,574 6,897,171 6,769,833 13,667,004 507,811
1997 676,282 1,031,064 1,707,346 7,546,700 7,434,797 14,981,497 556,652
1998 721,803 1,152,470 1,874,273 8,232,047 8,247,762 16,479,809 612,323
Sources and notes: Total gross capital formation (excluding residential and land improvement) for 1912-1938
Mizoguchi (1997), and for 1951-1998 from DGBAS, National Income in the Taiwan Area of the Republic of China
(1998). Capital formation from 1938-1951 on the basis of output series assuming investment-output ratios at 0.10 for
the period 1939-1944, at 0.00 for 1945 and 1946 and 0.05 for 1947-1950. Output from  Maddison (1995), Monitoring
the World Economy, 1820-1992 (OECD Development Centre). After linking, the whole investment series was
expressed in 1991 Taiwanese dollars. Pre-1951 figures were divided into series for nonresidential structures and
machinery and equipment using an average of the pre- and post-war period share of 75 per cent for structures.
Investment was accumulated by using the standardized asset lives of 39 years for structures and 14 years for
equipment from Maddison (1995). Stocks adjusted to mid-year. Estimates were converted to US dollars on the basis
of PPPs for investment obtained from Penn World Tables 5.3 (see Summers and Heston, 1991).
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Appendix Table 1.3 Nonresidential Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Nonresidential Gross Fixed
Capital Stock in South Korea and Taiwan, Manufacturing
South Korea Taiwan
GFCF GFCS GFCS GFCF GFCS GFCS
in 1990 in 1990 in 1990 in 1991 in 1991 in 1990
bln. Won bln. Won mln. US$ mln. NT$ mln. NT$ mln. US$
1935 3,200
1936 3,426
1937 2,717
1938 185 2,992
1939 236 3,575
1940 271 3,562
1941 275 3,918
1942 273 4,207
1943 277 2,868
1944 265 1,969
1945 0 0
1946 0 0
1947 78 1,249
1948 83 1,352
1949 90 1,463
1950 97 1,584
1951 0 2,104
1952 0 2,209
1953 81 3,760
1954 81 4,083
1955 144 2,434
1956 182 3,699
1957 197 4,079
1958 186 4,667
1959 154 4,762
1960 165 6,537 71,547 2,658
1961 163 6,853 74,929 2,784
1962 219 6,677 78,623 2,921
1963 285 2,936 4,518 7,943 83,078 3,087
1964 281 3,093 4,759 12,498 90,015 3,345
1965 388 3,275 5,039 15,144 100,268 3,726
1966 661 3,635 5,594 19,069 113,634 4,222
1967 656 4,129 6,354 28,999 133,606 4,964
1968 881 4,733 7,282 34,082 161,609 6,005
1969 1,000 5,511 8,479 37,386 194,924 7,243
1970 826 6,344 9,762 48,624 236,945 8,804
1971 1,067 7,291 11,218 51,432 286,973 10,663
1972 825 8,214 12,638 64,697 344,413 12,797
1973 1,532 9,344 14,377 77,820 414,371 15,396
1974 1,721 10,918 16,799 97,851 500,799 18,608
1975 2,270 12,857 19,783 118,325 607,363 22,567
1976 3,071 15,499 23,848 111,002 720,183 26,759
1977 4,348 19,208 29,555 93,332 820,194 30,475
1978 5,865 24,274 37,350 87,114 907,432 33,717
1979 6,364 30,308 46,635 114,742 1,004,439 37,321
1980 4,547 35,651 54,856 143,947 1,130,525 42,006
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1981 4,202 39,862 61,336 151,978 1,275,421 47,389
1982 4,360 43,954 67,631 128,669 1,411,855 52,459
1983 4,498 48,191 74,151 125,661 1,534,647 57,021
1984 6,106 53,323 82,047 159,823 1,672,675 62,150
1985 7,277 59,855 92,099 138,157 1,816,015 67,476
1986 9,033 67,847 104,396 187,484 1,972,141 73,277
1987 12,603 78,474 120,748 220,953 2,169,594 80,613
1988 14,357 91,702 141,101 243,525 2,394,523 88,971
1989 16,273 106,734 164,231 251,988 2,632,059 97,797
1990 18,920 123,996 190,791 252,347 2,870,406 106,653
1991 19,991 142,927 219,921 266,761 3,112,853 115,661
1992 17,673 161,101 247,884 294,380 3,369,390 125,193
1993 16,891 177,614 273,294 296,212 3,633,145 134,993
1994 22,117 196,178 301,857 367,318 3,929,176 145,992
1995 26,816 219,731 338,099 429,405 4,284,532 159,196
1996 30,511 247,448 380,746 485,281 4,691,847 174,330
1997 30,831 277,173 426,484 622,355 5,187,601 192,750
1998 686,798 5,770,918 214,424
Sources and notes: Total gross capital formation (excluding residential and land improvement) for 1953-
1997 (Korea) from Bank of Korea, National Accounts (various issues) and for 1951-1998 (Taiwan) from
DGBAS, National Income in the Taiwan Area of the Republic of China (various issues). Pre-1953/1951
estimates of capital formation were obtained using trend of total economy series (see Appendix Tables 1.1
and 1.2). After linking, the whole investment series was expressed in 1990 Won and 1991 Taiwanese
dollars. Investment was accumulated by using the standardized asset lives of 25 years for all nonresidential
capital, based on Van Ark and Pilat (1993). Moreover for South Korea we discounted all pre-1951
investment by 40 per cent for war damage (Maddison, 1998, Table 3.10, p. 66). Stocks adjusted to mid-
year. Estimates were converted to US dollars on the basis of PPPs for investment obtained from Penn
World Tables 5.3 (see Summers and Heston, 1991).
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Appendix Table 2.1 Disbursed Flow and Stock of Foreign Direct Investment in South Korea, 1970-
1995, in million 1990 Won
Flow of FDI Stock of FDI
Total Manu-facturing Manufac-
turing as a %
of total
Total Manu-
facturing
Manufac-
turing as a
% of total
1970       322,724
1971       101,653       424,377       306,077            0.72
1972       174,848          108,963               0.62       599,225       415,041            0.69
1973       353,879          230,770               0.65       953,103       645,811            0.68
1974       241,281          182,120               0.75    1,194,385       827,931            0.69
1975       111,509           74,992               0.67    1,305,893       902,923            0.69
1976       163,849          107,837               0.66    1,469,743    1,010,759            0.69
1977       179,745          110,203               0.61    1,649,488    1,120,962            0.68
1978       196,986          100,242               0.51    1,846,474    1,221,204            0.66
1979       178,228           88,246               0.50    2,024,703    1,309,450            0.65
1980         16,290             9,575               0.59    2,040,993    1,319,025            0.65
1981       139,775           93,063               0.67    2,180,768    1,412,088            0.65
1982         88,086           65,304               0.74    2,268,854    1,477,392            0.65
1983         89,804           54,598               0.61    2,358,658    1,531,991            0.65
1984       145,210           78,395               0.54    2,503,868    1,610,386            0.64
1985       268,689          178,987               0.67    2,772,558    1,789,373            0.65
1986       516,945          243,608               0.47    3,289,502    2,032,981            0.62
1987       601,017          335,990               0.56    3,890,520    2,368,971            0.61
1988       702,166          423,912               0.60    4,592,686    2,792,882            0.61
1989       608,694          363,882               0.60    5,201,380    3,156,764            0.61
1990       640,102          425,782               0.67    5,841,482    3,582,547            0.61
1991       816,382          670,399               0.82    6,657,864    4,252,945            0.64
1992       544,160          428,453               0.79    7,202,025    4,681,398            0.65
1993       491,101          339,802               0.69    7,693,125    5,021,200            0.65
1994       643,967          234,730               0.36    8,337,092    5,255,930            0.63
1995       821,368          364,549               0.44    9,158,459    5,620,479            0.61
Source: Flow in current prices for 1985-97 from OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook,
various issues, 1970-84 from UNCTC, World Investment Directory 1992, vol I, Asia and the Pacific, p.235
and 239. Deflated by implicit deflators for non-residential GFCF in total economy and for GFCF in
manufacturing from Bank of Korea, National Accounts 1990 and OECD National Accounts 1984-1996, vol
II. Stocks are calculated by accumulating flows combined with a benchmark stock in 1970 for total economy
and 1971 for manufacturing. The benchmark stocks are from UNCTC, World Investment Directory 1992, vol
I, Asia and the Pacific, p.239. These benchmarks at current prices are based on accumulated arrivals less
capital withdrawn since 1962. Benchmark stocks are deflated by implicit deflators for capital stock from Pyo
(1990).
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Appendix Table 2.2 Disbursed Flow and Stock of Foreign Direct Investment in Taiwan, 1952-1993, in million
1991 NT$
Flow of FDI Stock of FDI
Total Manu- Manufac- Total Manu- Manufac-
1952               56               42 76%                 56                 42
1953             271               90 33%               327               132
1954             139             111 79%               466               243
1955             244             164 67%               710               407
1956             246             174 71%               956               581
1957               97               46 47%            1,054               627
1958             141               89 63%            1,195               716
1959               77               33 43%            1,272               749
1960          1,251             971 78%            2,523            1,721
1961          1,219             491 40%            3,742            2,212
1962             463             305 66%            4,205            2,517
1963          1,646          1,149 70%            5,852            3,666
1964          1,761             705 40%            7,612            4,370
1965          3,465          2,541 73%          11,078            6,912
1966          2,400          1,529 64%          13,478            8,440
1967          4,648          3,623 78%          18,126          12,064
1968          7,127          4,721 66%          25,253          16,785
1969          8,297          6,035 73%          33,550          22,821
1970        10,640          7,774 73%          44,190          30,594
1971        12,222          9,442 77%          56,412          40,037
1972          9,140          5,553 61%          65,553          45,590
1973        14,016        12,879 92%          79,569          58,469
1974          7,837          6,557 84%          87,406          65,026
1975          5,072          3,456 68%          92,478          68,482 74%
1976          5,897          4,835 82%          98,375          73,317 75%
1977          6,651          3,550 53%        105,026          76,866 73%
1978          7,965          4,843 61%        112,991          81,710 72%
1979        10,323          6,992 68%        123,315          88,701 72%
1980        12,417        11,237 90%        135,731          99,938 74%
1981        10,363          6,668 64%        146,094        106,606 73%
1982        10,662          6,317 59%        156,756        112,923 72%
1983        11,709          9,625 82%        168,465        122,548 73%
1984        16,095        14,124 88%        184,560        136,672 74%
1985        20,649        15,510 75%        205,209        152,182 74%
1986        21,371        15,611 73%        226,580        167,794 74%
1987        32,650        22,050 68%        259,231        189,843 73%
1988        23,879        14,851 62%        283,110        204,694 72%
1989        43,927        29,674 68%        327,037        234,368 72%
1990        41,411        26,103 63%        368,447        260,470 71%
1991        31,479        21,978 70%        399,926        282,449 71%
1992        23,866        12,381 52%        423,792        294,830 70%
1993        20,128        11,386 57%        443,919        306,216 69%
Source: Disbursed FDI flows in current prices from data on approved FDI from Investment Commision,
MOEA (Dec 31, 1993) Statistics on Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment multiplied by average ratio
of disbursed and approved investment into Taiwan from Japan and USA (see Appendix Table 2.3). Deflated
with implicit deflator for non-residential GFCF in total economy and for GFCF in manufacturing from
DGBAS, National Income in Taiwan Area of the Republic of China, 1994. Stocks are calculated as
accumulated flows since 1952.
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Appendix Table 2.3 Comparison of Disbursed and Approved FDI  from Japan and USA into Taiwan
(1,000 US$), 1982-1993
Disbursed FDI Approved FDI Disbursed FDI /
(1) (2) (1)/(2)
1982 121,000            244,365              0.50
1983       173,000            296,809              0.58
1984       164,000            356,827              0.46
1985       116,000            486,765              0.24
1986       371,000            402,856              0.92
1987       712,000            878,743              0.81
1988       563,000            605,775              0.93
1989       671,000         1,048,494              0.64
1990       668,000         1,420,248              0.47
1991       884,000         1,147,327              0.77
1992       400,000            641,526              0.62
1993       465,000            513,073              0.91
1982-93 5,308,000 8,042,808              0.66
Source: Disbursed FDI from OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
Approved FDI from Investment Commision, MOEA (Dec 31, 1993) Statistics on Overseas Chinese and
Foreign Investment, Tables 4 and 7.
Appendix Table 2.4 Comparison of Disbursed FDI according to the Balance of Payments Statistics and Estimated
from Statistics on Approved FDI, Taiwan, 1976-1993, in 1,000 US$
FDI according Estimated
(1) (2) (2)/(1)
1976        67,382        93,398 139%
1977        48,382       108,175 224%
1978       111,226       140,526 126%
1979       126,281       217,021 172%
1980       166,275       307,522 185%
1981       151,242       261,187 173%
1982       104,011       250,792 241%
1983       149,021       266,936 179%
1984       200,881       368,751 184%
1985       339,905       463,601 136%
1986       325,900       508,427 156%
1987       714,412       936,361 131%
1988       958,294       780,438 81%
1989    1,603,817    1,596,001 100%
1990    1,330,000    1,519,097 114%
1991    1,271,000    1,173,701 92%
1992       879,000       964,461 110%
1993       917,000       800,856 87%
1976-93    9,464,027  10,757,250 114%
Source: Balance of Payments statistics for 1976-89 from UNCTC, World Investment Directory 1992, vol I,
Asia and the Pacific, p.299. Converted into US$ with exchange rate from DGBAS, National Income in
Taiwan Area of the Republic of China, 1994, Table 16. 1990-93 from DGBAS, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
November 1994, Table L-7. Estimated FDI from data on approved FDI from Investment Commission, MOEA
(Dec 31, 1993) Statistics on Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment multiplied by average ratio of
disbursed and approved investment for Japan and USA from
